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Abstract
Decision-makers have a wide variety of competing and complementary
methods for non-market valuation, but there is little formal advice on the
choice of method. I o¤er a formal approach, using a loss function (the
mean square error) to compare contingent valuation, CitizensJury and
methods where by intention only a portion of total value is estimated,
when a) preferences vary across the population and b) methods are more
or less susceptible to framing e¤ects. Illustrative simulations suggest con-
ditions under which the CitizensJury may dominate contingent valuation
when framing e¤ects are signicant.
1 Introduction.
There are many di¤erent means by which non-market decisions can be for-
malised. Some of the approaches regularly employed such as contingent valu-
ation and the travel cost method share a common underlying philosophy (e.g.
welfarism), but clearly some do not. For instance, advocates of CitizensJu-
ries (e.g. Crosby, 1991) or consensus conferences, attach as much value to the
process by which decisions are made as to whether the conclusions are reec-
tive of preferences. On the other hand, typical cost-benet techniques such as
hedonic pricing or contingent valuation are almost exclusively concerned with
the outcome (preference satisfaction) rather than the process.
Although there is some discussion of the issue, there has been relatively lit-
tle consensus on which methods are most appropriate or why one might choose
a method that viewed from the underlying normative principles appears dom-
inated by another method.1 For instance, within non-market valuation it is
generally only stated preference techniques such as contingent valuation which
can produce estimates for total values, including the values of non-users. In
theory therefore, revealed preference methods, such as the travel cost approach
1For instance, the standard guidance for cost-benet analysis in the UK is provided by the
Treasurys Green Bookwhich states only that, The technique chosen will depend on the
individual circumstances, and should be judged on a case-by-case basis.
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or dose response methods are inferior because they cannot estimate benets
to non-users. Nevertheless these techniques are alive and well and frequently
chosen in preference to contingent valuation, raising the question of why one
might choose such methods, or more generally what is the optimal valuation
technique.
The basic idea of the paper starts from the observation that most decision
processes place some weight on individual preferences. The problem is that
expressions of preference are potentially susceptible to framing e¤ects, where by
a framing e¤ect, I mean that elicited values may vary according to aspects of
the choices faced by consumers that, in standard consumer theory, should have
no e¤ect.
Typically the reliability of data on preference becomes weaker the further
decisions are removed from the realm of actual and repeated choice (List 2002)2 .
In choosing a process for producing information on preferences, the decision-
maker therefore faces choices between methods which are more prone to framing
e¤ects and methods, which might be less prone to anomalies, but which capture
only part of the value placed by the population on a potential benet. For
instance, regular users of a threatened wilderness may have much more robust
and precise preferences towards its conservation, compared to non-users, but
nevertheless non-users may still place some value on the wilderness. One way
to conceptualise the dilemma is in the form of a trade-o¤ between the variance
of an estimate of value and its bias: for instance regular wilderness users may
provide lower variance estimates of value, compared to values obtained from all
citizens, but by design an estimate based only one the values of one section of
the population will be biased. It is this trade-o¤ that is analysed here.
The trade-o¤s between closely related methods may be relatively straightfor-
ward to analyse because of the shared normative principles, but as I have already
remarked many alternative decision-making frameworks di¤er quite fundamen-
tally in their underlying rationale. One way to deal with conicting views on the
appropriate decision process is to try to judge processes according to a common
set of criteria, even if the original normative motives for the processes di¤er.
If, for instance, the strong sustainability criterion leads to higher preference
satisfaction than say contingent valuation (which rests on a goal of preference
satisfaction), then on purely instrumental grounds one can judge strong sustain-
ability as superior to contingent valuation without having to debate the relative
merits of the underlying philosophies. Thus we may be able to produce at least
an incomplete ordering of decision processes even in the absence of agreement
about deeper philosophies about how decisions should be made.3
2An obvious hypothesis, for which there is some support, is that the more ambiguity in
ones preferences. . . the more ones expressed preferences will be subject to procedural and
descriptive inuences. (Schkade and Payne, 1994, p. 105).
3 In this paper I take it as a given that the decision-maker wishes to know something about
a parameter that is related to preference. There are various responses one can make to the
evidence on framing and anomalies (Sugden 2005). One option is to dismiss the value of
preference elicitation exercises (Diamond and Hausman 1994) for public policy decisions. The
fundamental perspective in this paper is more pragmatic: preference information may be noisy
and unreliable, but unless it is innitely susceptible to framing e¤ects, it may provide useful
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Figure 1 summarises many of the alternative means by which decisions can
be made in an environmental context. As can be seen, methods vary to the
extent that they are base themselves on consumer preferences and on the extent
to which an attempt is made to estimate the a total gure for valuation. Strong
sustainability for instance, gives little weight to preference. Meanwhile, contin-
gent valuation does attempt to estimate a total value, but many other methods
such as the travel cost technique, dose response and hedonic pricing are partial
valuation methods, in that by design they omit some aspects of valuation, such
as non-use value. In what follows I compare di¤erent processes according to
the degree that they elicit a reliable gure for the Hicksian consumer surplus.
Other criteria could be used, but given consumer surplus is at the heart of the
cost-benet approach and its associated controversies, it makes sense to use it
as the vehicle for comparing decision processes. In order to motivate the com-
parison further, I also use three prototypical processes that have widespread use
and advocacy.
1. Contingent valuation
2. Partial valuation.
3. Citizens Jury, an example of deliberative methods.
Contingent valuation is perhaps the most widely used non-market valuation
method and possibly the most controversial. (e.g. Diamond and Hausman,
1994). Meanwhile, partial valuation methods (see Figure 1) are processes that
by intent do not seek to capture all of consumer surplus. They might do this in
one of three ways:
1. Restrictions on subjects. The researcher may for instance only gather
preference data on actual users of a resource. This is typically the case
with techniques such as the travel cost method.
2. Restrictions on aspects of valuation. The user/non-user distinction is fairly
obvious, but a process might also seek to identify only some part of use
value and ignore other contributions to welfare. For instance, the dam-
age done by pollutants might be estimated purely from data on mortality,
ignoring morbidity, the damage to plant life animals and the built envi-
ronment, as well as possibly harder to measure costs such as the reduced
amenity value from poor visibility.
3. Restrictions on preference variability. Some valuation methods, such as
the QALYS used in health evaluation can only be formally reconciled with
preference theory if preferences t a particular pattern. One argument for
such an approach is that, by imposing this restriction on elicitation pro-
cedures, researchers simplify the cognitive requirements for respondents.
guidance to decision-makers.
3
Figure 1: Decision Methods.
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Finally, a Citizens Jury (Crosby 1991) is an example of a deliberative
method (Bohman and Rehg 1997), a process where citizens are actively and
publicly involved in decision-making in a manner that encourages reason and
argument. The jury method involves placing a small group of ordinary people
together over a period of hours or days and asking them to reect upon a policy
issue. Typically, the jurists receive written and oral information from experts
and get the chance to interrogate witnesses about the basis of their evidence.
CitizensJuries originate in the USA (Crosby 1991), but have since spread to
many parts of the globe (Coote and Lenaghan, 1997) and used in environmental
decision-making (Aldred and Jacobs 2000). Taken-up by public agencies as well
as NGOs much of the justication for the use of juries arises from the notion that
in a functioning democracy a good decision is dened by the process by which the
decision is made as much as by the match between means and ends created by the
nal choice. However, at least one potentially important justication of Citizens
Juries is that they enable information to be transmitted and understood in such
a way that judgement biases are eliminated. Blamey et al, 2002, for instance
argue that deliberative methods are less likely to provoke yea-saying, strategic
behaviour, protest voting and biases created by social desirability. Meanwhile
Kenyon et al, 2003, in a discussion of two juries on environmental risks in
Scotland state that citizens jury process helps the participants to construct
their preferences in a rational and transparent manner p. 223. It follows
therefore that Citizens Juries are at least potential alternatives to methods
such as contingent valuation even when viewed through the lens of welfarist
principles (Wilson and Howarth 2002).
The plan for the remainder of the paper is as follows. In the next section I
outline the basic methodology of comparison and illustrate the problem of com-
paring decision processes using the example of elicitation e¤ects in contingent
valuation. Following that some simple formulae are derived for comparing the
performance of di¤erent processes. These formulae are then used to carry out
some illustrative calculations. In the nal section, a summary is o¤ered, along
with some thoughts on the implications of the paper.
2 A Formal Approach to Optimal Decisions.
Consider a decision-maker who must estimate an unknown parameter,, using
some estimator b. Acting on b rather than  produces a potential loss, L, for
the decision maker in the sense that a less than optimal decision may be made.
The loss is zero if  = b, but otherwise positive and increasing in the di¤erence
between b and . A conventional model for the loss function is that the costs
of a mistaken decision are proportional to the square of the di¤erence between
the true value and the estimate. That is,
Loss = aE
h
(b  )2i = a:var (b) + a (bias (b))2 = aMSE (b) (1)
Where var(:) is the variance, bias(b) = E [(b  )] ; a > 0 and MSE is the
mean squared error. In practice loss functions may not be symmetric, convex or
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μFigure 2: Estimators
continuous in the manner implied by the quadratic formulation, but if costs do
have this form, it follows that if the optimal estimator minimizes the expected
loss from the decision, then it also minimizes the mean square error. Conse-
quently, the optimal estimator is not necessarily unbiased. Figure 2 illustrates
the issue, showing two probability distributions for estimators: one estimator
(shown by the solid line) is unbiased, but because it has a larger variance, the
probability that is closer to its true value is higher with the alternative estimator
(shown by the broken line), despite the fact that the latter is biased.
When the parameter estimate is an aggregate measure of preferences, esti-
mated from data obtained from a sample of the population a¤ected by a project,
variance in can arise in two ways: rst, through a combination of sampling and
variability of the underlying preference parameter in the population. Secondly,
variance can arise through framing variation.
As dened here, we can think of frame variation arising from two distinct
sources. On the one hand the experimenter typically does not have the time
or the resources to examine all aspects of his or her elicitation method (Smith,
Desvousges and Fisher 1986). Many features of the design will be pre-tested
through piloting and focus groups and the past experience of other researchers
provides a stock of guidance, but there may also be aspects of the design (or
the interaction of the design and the environment in which it is used) which can
elude the researcher. The variables which determine values are almost countless:
particular payment vehicles may be more or less acceptable; data and questions
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early in the survey might provide anchors for later valuation questions; the
attitude and dress of interviewers can also inuence subjects. Thus even in the
best of surveys, there will be some residual uncertainty about the exact frame
elicited by the researcher.
Secondly, recall that the researcher is attempting to identify a true valua-
tion of the object. In order to do so, there must be a model of the relationship
between the frame and the true valuation of the resource. Running a revealed
preference study in parallel with the hypothetical exercise can give insight into
the correct frame, but the nature of non-market valuation is that this is imprac-
tical for many goods. Without revealed preference behaviour therefore, the best
frame represents something of a guess (albeit calculated) on the part of the re-
searcher and there may be conicting arguments what frame should be used. For
instance, suppose that a proposed project involves environmental degradation
of some kind, so that viewed from a property rights perspective willingness to
accept compensation (WTA) is the appropriate measure of lost value. But as is
widely noted in the contingent valuation literature (Mitchell and Carson 1989),
WTA appears more prone to producing unreliable estimates of value, compared
to willingness to pay (WTP) and in cases where through repetition and learning
the WTA-WTP gap is closed, it appears that most of the change occurs in the
WTA estimate (Shogren, Shin, Hayes and Kliebenstein 1994). This suggests
that the gures obtained from a one-shot WTP measure may be a better es-
timate of true WTA than a one-shot WTA gure. With arguments on both
sides the researcher may consider both WTA and WTP acceptable frames for
eliciting preferences over the environmental degradation.
2.1 Elicitation e¤ects.
Since the notion of frame variance is at the heart of this paper it is worthwhile
illustrating the problem with an example. Elicitation e¤ects occur when re-
sponses gathered from subjects are sensitive to the method of elicitation in a
manner inconsistent with standard, Hicksian consumer theory. Two widely re-
ported elicitation e¤ects are starting point e¤ects and yea-saying. Starting point
e¤ects (SPE) occur when reported valuations are correlated with some initial
valuation cue, such as the bid value in dichotomous choice (DC) questions. Yea-
saying describes the phenomenon of a subject agreeing to a proposal in the form
of a direct question that she or he would reject under other conditions. For in-
stance, a subject may agree to a bid price in a dichotomous choice format but
then provide a lower stated valuation in a subsequent valuation exercise. A key
di¤erence between the two elicitation e¤ects is that yea-saying is a unidirectional
phenomenon, i.e., it raises willingness to pay or reduces willingness to accept
whereas starting point bias can work in either direction depending on the value
of the cue.
Starting point e¤ects could be caused by anchoring, which, in the context
of valuation, occurs when an individuals reported or revealed valuation is cor-
related with some prior numerical cue. Since its preliminary identication by
Slovic and Lictenstein, 1971 manifestations of anchoring have been identied
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in numerous and diverse settings including the guessing of answers to multipli-
cation problems and estimating the number of African countries in the United
Nations (Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky 1982). A particularly stark example
of anchoring can be found in the recent work of Ariely et al, 2003, who asked
subjects for the nal two digits of their US social security number and found
that it was closely correlated with individualssubsequent valuations of a variety
of goods. Anchoring is therefore one possible reason for SPE, with the anchor
provided by the initial value of x o¤ered to subjects. The initial bid value might
act as a clue or hint towards the goods value, especially when respondents are
confused or unfamiliar with the good concerned (Bishop et al, 1983, McFadden,
1999, Brown et al, 1996). Since the domain of CVM often involves the valua-
tion of unfamiliar, non-marketed goods, this starting point problem has become
recognised as a potentially serious aw inherent in iterative bidding techniques.
( Boyle et al, 1996, p.193).
The phenomenon of yea-saying, well documented in the psychology litera-
ture (Arndt and Crane, 1975 and Couch and Keniston, 1960), has also been
proposed in the CVM context (Kristrom, 1993, Kanninen, 1995, Brown et al,
1996) as a possible inuence on DC responses. Brown et al (1996) argued that
the simplicity of the take-it-or-leave-it choice might generate a conicting objec-
tive in respondents. Torn between answering truthfully and showing a positive
preference, if a DC bid is above her/his maximum WTP, a subject may still
respond positively because s/he would like to demonstrate a positive preference
for the good in question. In addition to this, we might include the notion of the
good respondent (Orne 1962). Orne described how subjects, when faced with
o¢ cialdom, might respond positively to questions, only because they wrongly
believe that such a response is exactly what the interviewer (in a position of
perceived authority) wishes to hear.
One point to emphasise is that starting point e¤ects are not necessarily
conned to hypothetical choices concerning unfamiliar goods. Frykblom and
Shogren, 2000, for instance, use real choices and a split-sample design to value
an environmental economics text using 108 Swedish university students. One
treatment undergoes a Vickrey auction while the others face dichotomous choice
(DC) questions set at a variety of bid levels. The authors argue that both yea-
saying and anchoring will increase the acceptance of the proposal at high bid
levels, while the two e¤ects work in opposite directions for low bid levels. Hence
it is possible to test between the impact of these two e¤ects by comparing the
distribution of values derived from the auction with the upper and lower parts
of the distribution derived from the DC exercise. On the basis of their results,
they conclude that yea-saying is present, but not anchoring.
Alternatively, one could design an experiment in which for some subjects,
after the DC questions there is an incentive compatible open-ended (OE) val-
uation question. If only anchoring occurs the values derived from open-ended
questions should be consistent with the values from the DC questions, but if
only yea-saying is present then the distribution of values derived from the OE
questions should be independent of the bid level in the DC question and equal
to the distribution obtained from subjects who face an open-ended question
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Figure 3: The E¤ect of a Staring Point on Valuations.
without a prior DC question. This provides a clear cut means of distinguishing
between anchoring and yea-saying. Bateman et al, 2006, use this method, with
students as subjects and teabags and wine as the commodities As the Figure 4
suggests, they conclude in favour of yea-saying as the cause of the results. This
diagram shows none of the properties of the stylised anchoring e¤ect shown in
Figure 3 . Instead, the cumulative percentages bidding at each level (in UK
pounds) appear highly similar for all three treatments. Such results are at vari-
ance with the work of Ariely et al, 2003, who admittedly use less familiar goods.
On the other hand the Bateman et al results are consistent with Frykblom and
Shogren, 2000 and with the recent evidence on US consumption presented by
van Soest and Hurd, 2003. Partly the di¤erence may lie in the goods involved.
In Bateman et al 2006 experiment and in the last two studies cited, familiar
goods were the objects of valuation, whereas anchoring e¤ects seemed to have
been found most clearly when subjects were facing novel or unfamiliar valuation
tasks, which is often the case in environmental valuation.
The deeper conclusion from this literature is that even in an incentive com-
patible environment with well-trained and experienced subjects, with real goods
and simple choices, di¤erent frames produce di¤erent valuations. Thus the re-
searcher cannot be entirely certain about which method of elicitation is superior.
2.2 Gold standard frames.
There are a number of possible responses to framing e¤ects of the kind illustrated
above. When Diamond and Hausman, 1994, asked is some number better
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than no numberthey responded that very often with stated preference it was
better to have no number. But possibly a more common response has been
to advocate a golden standard for preference elicitation and by doing so to
eliminate the frame variance. A gold standard or optimal frame is therefore
one where the manner in which preference information is elicited is specied
precisely and which passes all tests of validity. Methods which meet the gold
standard produce acceptable information, but methods which do not meet the
standard require the rejection of information or at least a signicant reduction
in its value.
For economists, especially those involved in environmental valuation, guid-
ance on what constitutes an optimal or gold standard frame is available in large
quantities. Within the contingent valuation approach, Mitchell and Carsons
1989 comprehensive book is probably still the dominant source of framing ad-
vice, supplemented by the guidelines produced by the 1992 NOAA panel under
the chairmanship of Kenneth Arrow (Arrow et al, 1993) which produced what
it called "a fairly complete set of guidelines compliance with which would dene
an ideal CV survey". For instance there is a general requirement that,
in the absence of a set of reliable reference surveys, the bur-
den of proof shall remain on the researchers. A survey should be
judged unreliable to the extent it exhibited the following defects:a
high non-response rate, inadequate responsiveness to scope, lack of
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understanding of the task by respondents, lack of credibility of the
restoration scenario". (Arrow et al, 1993, p. 37)
More recent advice has been put forward by Carson, 1998, 2000, amongst
others and there are a number of environmental valuation manuals being pro-
duced or available for government economists.(e.g. Bateman et al, 2002).
Richard Carson, 2000 is a clear and thoughtful summary of some general
principles in the wake of the NOAA panel. For him, fundamentally a well-
conducted CV exercise must have three attributes: the good to be valued must
be well-dened; there must be plausible means of provision and there must
be a plausible means of making trade-o¤s. A good that is vaguely dened
by the surveyors may be understood in widely di¤ering ways by subjects in
the survey. To aid the credibility of the exercise with regard to the payment
vehicle, Carson recommends coercion where this is credible. Ideally, the vehicle
should also appear reasonably fair, as well as plausible and understandable to
the respondents in the survey. In addition to these features of the survey frame,
the sampling process should be carefully designed so that population estimates
of value can be derived; statistical methods should allow for the possibility of
zero willingness to pay values and the whole procedure should be transparent.
Transparency is also a feature advocated by the practitioners who argue that
preferences are not always in place ready for the survey analyst, but must be
constructed by the individual respondent in the course of the valuation exer-
cise. In other ways the recommended methodology is fundamentally di¤erent.
Gregory and Slovic, 1997, for instance argue that
the analyst therefore functions as an architect, helping respon-
dents build their values from simpler pieces rather than (following
the economics model) as an archaeologist whose task is to uncover
values presumed to exist 1997:177.
Typically, options di¤er along many dimensions. For some dimensions, such
as environmental damage or risks to health, subjects may be unused to ex-
pressing values in terms of a single metric such as money. They may also be
cognitively overloaded if faced with choices between two complex options which
di¤er in many important ways. Consequently, they argue that subjects should
be rst asked to compare alternatives along single dimensions, using valuation
scales natural to the dimension. Only later should subjects be asked to make
trade-o¤s between di¤erent dimensions and invited to attach weights. This they
argue, limits the cognitive overload that might otherwise hinder subjects ability
to choose between alternatives.
Unlike the typical CV instrument which seeks to gain values from a repre-
sentative sample of the population, Gregory and Slovics constructive approach
uses only small numbers of key stakeholders. They recommend a ve-step ap-
proach to valuation in which subjects are given constructive support in their
decision-making. This approach di¤ers in a number of important ways from
the standard cv method, but whichever way it is approached, there are two
11
fundamental problems with the golden frame perspective on valuation. First
the guidance may not be exact enough, in the sense that the researcher how-
ever well-funded is not in a position to control exactly the perception of the
survey and its purpose in all respondents. The impact of changes in the way
information is presented visually, or in elicitation formats, or in the order in
which questions are asked may all be tested by the researcher, but some aspect
of the survey design or its implementation is bound to escape the attention of
the researcher or may interact with the target samples experience in an unan-
ticipated manner. In other words there is always some residual variance in the
frame elicited in the mind of the subject and this is one source of the frame
variance discussed above.
Secondly, in drawing up the denition of the gold frame, there is often no
denitive reason for favouring a frame with aspect x rather than aspect y. We
see this in the anchoring and yea-saying experiments discussed above, where
even with real goods and real choices changes in the way in which preference
information is elicited can a¤ect values. In the case of contingent valuation, an
experienced practitioner claims that "Each of the three main response formats
has strengths and weaknesses" (Boyle, 2003 p. 137,) referring to the choice
between open-ended, dichotomous choice and payment cards in a recent guide
to the contingent valuation method. The dichotomous choice elicitation method
is often recommended (e.g. by the NOAA panel, ), largely on the grounds of its
perceived incentive compatibility. However, the bid levels provided to subjects
in DC may provoke starting point e¤ects and therefore responses at variance
to individualstrue preferences (if they have them). Dichotomous choice is also
ine¢ cient in that it produces very little information per subject. In response to
the anchoring problem, one might use payment cards - which is where a subject
sees a card or screen with a set of bid levels and is asked for his or her preferred
option. In response to the ine¢ ciency of the DC method, there has been a
recent trend towards conjoint methods, in which subjects face a sequence of
choices, often between more than two options. Both the alternative elicitation
formats lack the clear incentives for truth-telling provided by the DC method,
but they clearly have other advantages and it is not obvious where the balance
lies. This then is the second source of frame variance: the set of acceptable
frames contains more than one element.
3 Formal comparison.
Recall, that processes are compared according to their mean squared error, that
is the sum of the variance and the square of the bias.. Suppose that there are
F acceptable frames (with F>1) from within which one frame is selected at
random.4 The estimator is a random variable, b, which in frame j, we label as
4Although this is not an issue pursued here, the astute reader will note from the following
derivations that MSE may be lowered by splitting the sample across frames. Such a strategy
may be feasible when it is the researcher who has full control over the frame. However when
there is residual uncertainty over how subjects will interpret the valuation process, then it
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bj , j = 1; :::; F;with an expected value of bj . within frame j and an expected
value across frames of b. In other words,
b = 1
F
j=FX
j=1
bj = 1F
j=FX
j=1
E
bj (2)
The within frame variance of bj is 2j = E bj   bj2 ; with the expected
value of it across frames dened as 2 = 1F
Pj=F
j=1 
2
j : . Meanwhile, the frame
variance, denoted by 2f is the variance across the frames of the mean estimates.
That is,
2f =
1
F
j=FX
j=1
bj   b2 (3)
Let the sample size used in the process be n, with individual observations in-
dexed by i = 1,...,n. Each random variable within this sample is assumed to be
i.i.d. We let bji be the ith element of the sample when the frame is j. The total
variance of the process, var (b), is then
var (b) = E
24 X
i
bi
n

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n
!!235 (4)
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Note that the penultimate line of this expression arises from the i.i.d. nature of
the sample. Using this expression, the formula for MSE becomes:
MSE =
2
n
+ 2f +
b  2 (5)
may not be in the power of the researcher to choose the exact frame.
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Comparing processes is then a matter of comparing the MSE for di¤erent
decision-making approaches.
Now, each of the processes selected for the comparison has its strengths and
weaknesses which we need to formalise. Most jury exercises begin by recruiting
a representativesample of individuals. To be manageable, CitizensJury have
to be small, so there is a potential problem of high variance due to the small
sample of individuals involved. For instance, the Je¤erson Institute (which
trade-marked the term Citizens Jury in the USA, but not elsewhere) argue
in favour of a jury of 18 people (Crosby 1991). Unless preference variability
across the population is extremely small, sampling variability with deliberative
processes is likely to be large. In the guidelines for the original Je¤erson Centre
exercise, one of the essential elements was random sampling for members of
the jury. 5 Let n be the size of the CitizensJury. When the jury convenes,
n individuals arrive at a collective value for the mean value. Suppose that,
by conversation, they arrive at the correct frame. I shall call this an ideal
CitizensJury (ICJ). It has already been stressed that CitizensJuries are most
often justied in terms other than preference satisfaction, so the term ideal
here simply refers to the lack of bias in the outcome, without prejudging any
other features of the process. Further, suppose that the mean value produced
by the jury is the mean of their individual values.6 If the n members are chosen
randomly, then the expected value obtained from this process is also .
With contingent valuation on the other hand judgement biases are not nec-
essarily eliminated within any given frame, but samples are potentially large
enough to limit sampling variability and the set of acceptable frames is ideally
chosen so that there is no ex ante bias.
For the PV method the benets can be decomposed. For the purposes of
the exercise it does not matter what these components are, only that they can
be conceptually separated in what follows. Let  = e + n where the labels of
the components are chosen to indicate estimatedand non-estimatedvalues
respectively. For the partial valuation method only e is estimated. Ideally,
a partial valuation method may be chosen because the part of the benets
estimated are not subject to signicant framing e¤ects7 - in other words the
frame variance is zero, but by denition it will omit the values of some users
or uses or force data on preferences into a very specic functional form. As a
result we can expect systematic bias. However, as with contingent valuation, the
5 In many actual CJ exercises, the process of juror recruitment has been rather less formal
or di¤erent criteria have been used . In some cases volunteers are recruited by word of mouth
or advertisement. A typical worry is that this slants the jury and therefore its verdict. We
might suppose that individuals at one extreme or other of the distribution of values would be
attracted to serve. A symmetric distribution of values might then conceivably still generate an
unbiased estimate of the population mean value, with the extremes cancellingone another
out. With skewed distributions such a comforting hypothesis seems less reasonable.
6 In an original paper, Howarth and Wilson, 2006, put forward a formal argument for
why the willingness to pay of a group engaged in deliberative valuation should be less than
the average willingness to pay of individual members. In other words, deliberative valuation
induces its own bias in valuation.
7This is the underlying claim about the superior value of revealed preference methods.
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sample may be chosen to be su¢ ciently large and random to all-but eliminate
sampling variation.
Formally therefore, I dene each of the methods to be compared as follows:
Denition 1 Contingent valuation (CV): n =1; b   = 0:
Denition 2 Ideal CitizensJury (ICJ): b   = 0; 2f = 0:
Denition 3 Partial valuation (PV): n =1; b   =  n < 0; 2f = 0:
Given these formalisations we therefore have:
MSECV = 
2
f (6)
MSEICJ =
2
n
MSEPV =
b  2 = 2n:
The optimal decision process is then the one with the lowest MSE. 8
Dene  = f= as the coe¢ cient of frame variation, let  = =
p
n be
the coe¢ cient of sample variation with B = = as the coe¢ cient of population
variation and let s = n= be the share of total benets omitted by the partial
valuation method. Then we can easily manipulate 6 to show that CV is as least
as good as PV when,
  s (7)
Meanwhile CV is at least as good as ICJ provided,
   (8)
Finally, PV is as least as good as ICJ, when
s   (9)
Figure 5 summarises the circumstances under which each decision rule dom-
inates the other two. We have three regions of dominance. As the proportion
8The simplicity of the expression for MSEPV suggests a relatively straightforward algo-
rithm for choosing which components of valuation to estimate when there are more than two
alternatives: add a component if the square of its mean value is greater than the variance or
equivalently, add if its coe¢ cient of variation is less than 1. However, suppose for instance
there are N components of total value, j are included in the set to be estimated and we wish to
consider a j+1th component. In the absence of correlation between the components, the change
in the loss function from adding the j+1th component is j+1[ j+1   2(  J+1)] + 2j+1
where j+1 is the mean value of the j+1th component,  is the mean of total value, J+1 is
the sum of the mean values of components 1 to J+1 and 2j+1 is the variance of the j+1th
component. It follows that, compared to the simple expression, this more general expression
gives more weight to reducing the bias compared to raising the variance. Thus a coe¢ cient of
variation less than one is a su¢ cient condition for a component to be added, but not necessary
(except when it is the nal component to be considered).
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Figure 5: A Comparison of Three Methods
of total benets omitted by the PV estimation technique becomes smaller, the
PV method raises its advantage compared to the other two rules. Once the
coe¢ cient of frame variation is larger than s, then PV produces a lower MSE
than contingent valuation. Similarly if the coe¢ cient of sample variation is
large compared to s, then PV is superior to the ideal CitizensJury. For the
comparison between ICJ and CV, s is irrelevant what matters is the relative
size of the coe¢ cients of variation. If the frame coe¢ cient is larger then ICJ is
superior to CV, but if the sample coe¢ cient is larger then CV is the superior
elicitation method. Thus for the comparison between CV and ICJ three things
matter: the size of the CitizensJury sample; the variance of tastes within the
population and the sensitivity of expressions of preferences to changes in the
frame.
Recall that the particularly simple formulae and diagram represent the re-
sult of some strong simplifying assumptions, particularly that ICJ and partial
valuation methods do not su¤er from framing variation. Adding in these ele-
ments would raise the relative advantage of the contingent valuation process.
On the other hand, allowing for sampling variation in contingent valuation and
partial valuation would lower their advantages relative to the ICJ.
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3.1 Example 1: WTA versus WTP.9
To illustrate the formulae we consider two examples. The rst example supposes
that there are only two possible frames, namely buying and selling and therefore
two possible values: willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA).
There is uncertainty over the correct frame for valuation purposes, not because
of uncertainty over property rights and the researcher believes that WTA and
WTP are equally likely to be the correct way of eliciting valuation. LetWTA =
(1 + )WTP then the mean value across frames is (1 + 0:5)WTP . The frame
variance is 2WTP 2=4 so the coe¢ cient of frame variation is =(2 + ).
We rst calculate critical values of n (the size of the jury) when the CV
approach and ICJ have equal MSE. In other words,
n =
2
2f
=
(2 + )2B2
2
(10)
To determine the range of sensible values for the coe¢ cients in this expres-
sion, recall the experimental evidence: the ratio of mean WTA to WTP typically
exceeds 1 by a signicant amount and ratios of four or more are not uncommon
( Horowitz and McDonnell, 2002, or Sayman and Onculer, 2005).
There is no systematic evidence on the coe¢ cient of population variation
from the CV literature, but a sample of CV studies is assembled in Table 1.
Though this sample is not entirely systematic and the studies do not claim to
randomly sample members of the population, it suggests that a range for B from
0.5 to 2.5 is reasonable.
As can be seen in Table 2 the critical size for the CitizensJury is sensi-
tive to the value of B. While the Je¤erson Institute favour a jury size of 18,
other sources suggest 16-25 members as a sensible range of number for an e¤ec-
tive process, which would imply that despite the small numbers involved, the
ICJ may outperform the CV exercise when it is not clear whether the optimal
frame should present the policy changes as a loss or a gain and the variance of
preferences across the population is small.
The nal column of the table illustrates a di¤erent comparison: between
contingent valuation and partial valuation for di¤erent values of the WTA/WTP
ratio. In the column, s is the critical share of total benets not estimated by
the partial valuation method such that  = s. In the example s = =( + 2):
From the column we can see that when WTA is only 50% bigger than WTP
then the partial valuation method must estimate 75% of total benets to be of
equal value to the contingent valuation method. However, by the time the ratio
of WTA/WTP is equal to 4, the partial valuation method can be superior even
if it omits 3/5 of the benets.
Estimates of s are hard to come by (see Table 3). Typically when contingent
valuation is compared to the travel cost method, for example, both procedures
9 It is of course well-known that WTA will exceed WTP for normal goods and that in
theory, the gap between the two values can be large in the absence of close substitutes for
the good being valued. In this example we suppose that is is unknown to what extent the
disparity is due to framing e¤ects.
17
Table 1: Evidence on the coe¢ cient of population variation, B.
Authors Method Measure Good B
Halvorsen and
Slensminde, 1998
OE WTP Reducing prema-
ture deaths
0.9
Adamowicz and
Bhardawaj, 1993
OE WTA Movie tickets 0.92
Bateman et al, 1995 OE WTP Flood defences 1.70
Johannson et al,
1997
OE WTP Chocolates 0.84
Whittington et al,
1990
OE WTP Water, public
standpipe
0.54
Whittington et al,
1990
OE WTP Water, private sup-
ply
1.32
Boyle et al, 1996 OE WTP Oil spill clear up 0.34
Silberman et al,
1992
OE WTP Beach quality
(users)
1.37
Silberman et al,
1992
OE WTP Beach quality
(never will use)
1.83
Kontoleon and
Swanson, 2003
OE WTP Panda reserves 1.05
Thayer, 1981 Bidding
game
WTP Landscape preser-
vation
1.08
Amigues et al, 2002 OE WTA Riparian habitat
conservation
2.80
Notes: OE = open ended. Sample standard deviations used.
Table 2: Critical values of n for equivalence of CV and ICJ.
Coe¢ cient of population variation Critical s
WTA/WTP ratio 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
1.5 6 25 56 100 156 0.20
1.75 3 13 30 54 84 0.25
2 2 9 20 36 56 0.33
2.5 1 5 12 22 34 0.43
3 1 4 9 16 25 0.50
4 1 3 6 11 17 0.60
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are partial valuations, since it is only visitors to the site who are sampled (Carson
et al, 1996), not all potential beneciaries. The early study on hunting permits
by Bishop and Heberlein, 1979, also included a travel cost exercise, where for a
zero cost of time, the method produced estimates of $159,000 for total benets.
This compares to $880,000 obtained from the real purchase of permits o¤ the
hunters (i.e. a WTA gure), suggesting a crude gure of s = 0:82; if we ignore
possible di¤erences between WTA and WTP. When higher values for the cost of
time were used, s fell to 0.28. Meanwhile, when the zero cost of time gures were
compared to hypothetical WTP elicited from a comparison group of hunters,
s = 0:46. In the case of non-use values, Greenley et al, 1981, estimate 19-27%
of benets for improvements to water quality in a south Colorado, USA, river
system represent existence value.10 If non-use benets were the ones omitted
from a partial valuation (i.e. s = 0:19   0:27), this would suggest that partial
valuation outperforms a full valuation for standard gures for the WTA/WTP
ratio.
In the context of healthcare, Clarke, 2002, compares travel cost11 and con-
tingent valuation estimates for rural pregnancy services in Australia using a
mail-based survey. He nds that estimates from the travel cost method are
approximately 56% of those obtained via contingent valuation (i.e. s = 0:44).
Meanwhile, Kennedy 2002 compares revealed preference and contingent valua-
tion measures for radon protection and obtains a gure for the former which is
67% of the latter (i.e. s = 0:33). Again, making the heroic assumption that this
di¤erence is purely due to benets omitted from the revealed preference meth-
ods it would suggest that partial valuation outperforms contingent valuation for
many realistic values of the WTA/WTP ratio.
Table 3: Some Estimates for omitted benets, s.
Study Good Partial Valuation s
Bishop and
Heberlein,
1979
Hunting permits Travel cost 0.28-0.82
Greenley et
al, 1981
Water quality Use values 0.19-0.27
Clarke, 2002 Maternity services Travel cost 0.44
Huang et al,
1997
Recreational water quality Travel cost 0.27
Kennedy,
2002
Radon protection Hedonic pricing 0.33
10Cummings and Harrison, 1995 argue forcefully that it is not possible to separate the values
held by one individual into existence or non-use and use values.
11 It is well-known that travel cost methods produce estimates for the Marshallian consumer
surplus. For normal goods this underestimates the Hicksian compensating surplus. In theory
if income and price elasticities are identied, the Hicksian surplus can be estimated. The point
is this gure would still omit the non-use value non-users and hence even the adjusted gure
from travel cost studies will be a partial valuation measure.
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Figure 6: Optimal decisions for s=0.4 and n=25
Figure 6 o¤ers a simultaneous comparison of all three approaches. For the
purposes of this illustration, I assume that s = 0:4 and that a jury of up to
25 is possible - the latter is fairly generous to the ICJ method and this is
reected in the gure, where we can see that none of the approaches has a
decisive advantage over the other methods for typical parameter combinations.
Comparing all three approaches (CV, ICJ and PV) we can see that contingent
valuation has its clearest advantage when the WTA/WTP ratio is low (i.e. close
to 1), preference variation within the population is high and, at the same time
partial valuation methods capture only a small percentage of the total value.12
It might reasonably be assumed that the sample size for any CV or PV
exercise cannot be innite. It is a straightforward matter to adjust the relevant
equations for a nite sample of m:
MSECV = 
2
f +
2
m
(11)
MSEPV = 
2
n +
2
m
:
12 In the Bishop and Heberlein, 1979, article referred to above, the WTA/WTP ratio for
hypothetical valuation was 4.8, giving a critical value of 66% for s. The intermediate cost-of
time travel cost estimate would therefore dominate hypothetical valuation, but an ICJ would
easily dominate both given a value of B  1 (see Li et al, 1996 for this last gure).
20
The borderline between PV and CV is unchanged13 . Meanwhile the critical
size of the ICJ becomes:
n =
(2 + )2B2=2
1 + (2 + )2B2=m2
(12)
The e¤ect on the comparisons of this sections is small. For instance, if we
take a representative CV sample of 400 individuals, a value of B of 4 and a
value of 5 for the WTA/WTP ratio then the critical value of n is reduced by
4% compared to the case where m is innite. This amounts to approximately 1
person for the typical critical values in Table 2.
Instead of there being sampling variation with CV, if there is framing varia-
tion of 2f (0    1) for the CitizensJury method, then the MSE becomes,
MSEICJ = 
2
f +
2
n
(13)
The critical size of the ICJ is then,
n =
2
(1  )2f
=
(2 + )2B2=2
1   (14)
As a result, the critical values of n reported in Table 2 are inated by 1=(1  ).
We have no evidence on reasonable values for , but the key point here is that as
long as  is small, then ICJ will maintain its advantage over CV in the conditions
illustrated by Table 2.
Finally, a more general expression for comparing PV with the other measures
can be obtained if we suppose that the frame variance of the partial valuation
method is some fraction  of the CV frame variance. We then obtain 
p
1   
s for the comparison between CV and partial valuation. To put this into some
kind of perspective: if the frame variance for partial valuation is half the gure
for CV, then the critical gures for s in the nal column of Table 2 would be
reduced by about 30%.
3.2 Example 2: Elicitation methods.
Table 3 provides an example where all the elicitation methods used produce a
gure for WTP. In the well-known Bateman et al, 1995, paper a CV exercise
is conducted on an aspect of the Norfolk Broads (a national park located near
to Norwich, UK). Some respondents face a straightforward open ended (OE)
question. Others face a dichotomous choice, with a follow-up open-ended ques-
tion. In the table IB OE refers to this question; c refers to the estimates of
WTP from the dichotomous choice answers based on the assumption that any
values between zero and innity are possible, while c uses the same data, but
13This is only true if the population preference variance is the same for partial and full
valuation. If it is not then another parameter is required for the comparison of valuation
methods. However, the thrust of this section is that for typicaly feasible sample sizes, sampling
variation plays only a small part in the MSE for PV and CV methods.
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Table 4: Mean WTP values and critical jury sizes for di¤erent acceptable sets.
Acceptable Frames
All Open
ended
Un-
truncated
All DC OE after
DC
OE 67 67 67 - -
IB OE 74.9 74.9 - - 74.9
C** 112 - - 112 112
C*** 144 - 144 144 144
Mean value across
frames
99.5 71.0 105.5 128.0 109.5
Coe¢ cient of frame
variation
0.28 0.05 0.30 0.10 0.26
Critical n, B = 0.5 3 121 3 24 4
Critical n, B = 1 13 484 11 96 15
Critical n, B = 1.5 29 1089 25 216 34
assumes that no values beyond the highest bid level (£ 500) are credible. The
mean gures from the four estimation methods form a pattern that might be
anticipated: OE produces the lowest estimate, the dichotomous choice estimates
are somewhat higher and the follow-up OE question produces an estimate which
is lower than that from the dichotomous choice questions but possibly because
of anchoring it is still higher than the basic OE estimate.
I consider di¤erent groups of acceptable frames. For the rst one, the prior is
that all frames appear equally credible; in the remaining four cases only two of
the elicitation methods are possible candidates for being the elicitors of the true
value. One group consists of just the open-ended WTP gures; one eliminates
the datasets where there is some truncation by the researchers of the acceptable
values; a fourth group consists of just the dichotomous choice variants, while
the nal group uses two sources of data (OE and dichotomous choice) drawn
from the same individuals. In the table therefore ve estimates of the critical n
are produced for each possible B. I vary B over three values from 0.5 to 1.5.
As can be seen, the critical value of n varies enormously. When the choice is
across OE or DC-based methods of elicitation, an ideal CJ consisting of 16-25
members might outperform CV for some low values of B. On the other hand,
if the set of possible frames lies within OE variants or within DC variants then
ICJ is inferior. In this context it is worth noting that in the actual study, the
value for B from the raw open-ended WTP was 1.7 which would rule out ICJ for
any set of acceptable frames. Meanwhile the highest value for frame variation
is 0.28, meaning that any partial valuation would have to capture at least 72%
of the total valuation in its estimates for it to dominate the mix of contingent
valuation methods used in the research.14
14As above, setting a nite level for the CV sample size produces only a marginal reduction
in the critical values of n in this table.
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4 Summing up.
This paper has examined one means by which non-market valuation methods
can be compared. In a sense it provides an answer to Hausman and Diamonds
when is no number better than any number question. Generally the answer
is never, given a choice between decision processes. Nevertheless we have seen
clear reasons why the gures obtained from a contingent valuation exercise may
be less useful from those obtained from a method that appears a priori inferior.
In the examples, I stress the possibility that partial valuation methods and
approaches such as the CitizensJury may, under specic circumstances be supe-
rior to contingent valuation, particularly when WTA is viewed as an acceptable
frame, but it is worth reiterating the point made earlier, that whereas contin-
gent valuation and its associated techniques have been exhaustively examined
for anomalies and inadequacies many of the alternatives have not received sim-
ilar scrutiny. It is particularly worth emphasising that the potential advantage
of the partial valuation methods lies in the absence or reduction of framing
variance when such alternatives are used. To the extent that a partial valua-
tion method is subject to the same kinds of framing variance that plagues fully
specied contingent valuation, then the partial valuation method loses its supe-
riority. The same applies to CitizensJuries and consensus methods which have
not thus far been tested extensively for framing invariance.15
One interpretation of the examples is that the frame variance drives the re-
sults. In other words, without any restriction on the set of acceptable frames,
partial valuation and ICJ methods dominate contingent valuation. To the extent
that some frames are excludable from the set of acceptable frames, for instance
by using the criteria set out by the NOAA panel, then viewed from the perspec-
tive of preference satisfaction, the advantage of alternative decision-processes
over contingent valuation diminishes.
The results also suggest what meta-data we need to know in order to make
a choice between decision processes. Estimates of the variation in tastes within
the sample are often not reported from valuation exercises, but would provide
a useful guide to the choice of technique. Similarly, a database comparing
values from users to total values would be benecial. More fundamentally, more
exercises in which frame variance was compared amongst di¤erent groups such
as users versus non-users would be a step towards the optimal choice of decision
processes.
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